… designul inteligent din nou in actualitate

http://romanian.ruvr.ru/by_author/104419070/

http://romanian.ruvr.ru/2013_06_23/Designul-inteligent-din-nou-in-actualitate/

Cum a aparut viata pe Terra

Viața pe Terra, este rezultatul adaptării la anumite condiții impuse sau s-a născut în urma unei evoluții  specifice prin selecție naturală determinată de hazard?

Problematica și complexitatea paradigmei – Apariția vieții pe Terra, nu este nici pe departe a fi soluționată, deși cercetătorii fac eforturi considerabile, momentan asistăm doar la noi supoziții științifice, care ar putea să ajute la înțelegerea fenomenelor care au condus la apariția vieții pe Pământ, în urmă cu miliarde  de ani.

http://romanian.ruvr.ru/2013_05_11/Cum-a-aparut-viata-pe-Terra/

 

 

A existat posibilitatea apariţiei vieţii în Univers înainte de formarea Pământului ca planetă?

Gabriel Teodorescu

21 aprilie 2013 09:49Posibil DA! Dacă se confirmă ipoteza, conform căreia, viața a apărut înaintea formării Terrei, atunci cu certitudine germenii vieții provin din spațiul cosmic.

Unicitatea vieţii. Cine şi de ce a proiectat viaţa pe Terra?

18 aprilie 2013 11:03Vă supunem atenţiei un comentariu al cititorului nostru, domnul Gabriel Teodorescu, despre provenienţa vieţii pe Terra. „Nu suntem în centrul Universului, dar suntem în cea mai bună locaţie pentru ca viața complexă să apară și să înflorească pentru a observa ce este dincolo de noi”- Planeta privilegiată, Gonzalez și Richards, 2004.

Turbulenţele atmosferice pot fi corelate cu undele gravitaţionale?

15 aprilie 2013 10:44

Oamenii de ştiinţă sunt tot mai preocupaţi de creşterea turbulenţelor zborurilor. Vă prezentăm pe această temă o analiză a cititorului nostru, domnul Gabriel Teodorescu.

… o romanca arhitect – concept indraznet si de atractie in Paris

http://www.ziare.com/vacanta/atractii/podul-gonflabil-peste-sena-un-concept-indraznet-galerie-foto-1196917

Propunere unui nou calendar de catre cercetatorii de la John Hopkins University din Baltimore – anul are 364 de zile.

Propunere unui nou calendar

Matematicieni si economisti, de la John Hopkins University din Baltimore au propus un nou calendar in care anul are 364 de zile.

Noul calendar ar avea o mai mare previzibilitate, anii ar fi identici,  astfel ca zilele importante ar cadea la fel in fiecare an, scrie <a href=”http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2079474/Hanke-Henry-Permanent-Calendar-proposes-make-year-identical.html” target=”_blank”>Daily Mail</a>.

Noul calendar este diferit de actualul calendar Gregorian, cunoscut ca si calendar crestin si adoptat de lumea occidentala. Calendarul Gregorian, a inlocuit vechiul calendar Iulian, si a fost introdus pentru prima oara de catre Papa Grigore al-XIII-lea in 1582. Calendarul Gregorian reglementeaza ciclurile ceremoniale ale bisericii romano-catolice si ale biserici protestante, scopul sau initital a fost unul ecleziastic. Calendarul ebraic este cel oficial pentru Israel si credinta iudaica, si este format din 12 sau 13 luni, o luna avand 29 sau 30 de zile.

In general in lume se deosebesc doua feluri de calendare in functie de cilcul solar sau dupa mersul Lunii. Anul solar are aproximativ 365 de zile. Anul lunar este bazat pe luni selenare de cate 29 de zile si jumatate, avand 354 de zile si determina imposibilitate realizarii unei corespondente intre luna si anotimp. Calendarul Islamic este de tip lunar, si incepe intr-o vineri pe 16 iulie 622 pentru a marca ziua in care profetul Mohamed ajunge la Medina, eveniment denumit Hejira. Calendarul chinezesc este de tip luni-solar, calculele sale se bazeaza pe pozitiile ocupate de Soare si Luna.

Noul calendar propus de americani, pastreaza saptamana de 7 zile, dar introduce corectii referitoare la luni.  Modificarea apare in cazul lunii septembrie care ar avea 31 de zile. Coordonatorul cercetarii dr. Richard Henry a precizat ca astfel se obtine un calendar stabil,  care va fi absolut identic an de an si care va permite o planificare permanenta si rationala a activitatilor umane. Noul calendar ar fi benefic si din punct de vedere economic. Conform declaratiilor economistului Steve Hanke, acest calendar ar simplifica calculele financiare aducand o serie de beneficii economice.  Anul, conform noului calendar este impartit in trimestre, avand 91 de zile, cu doua luni de 30 de zile si a treia de 31 de zile. Opinia specilistilor americani este ca noul calendar este mult mai convenabil si usor de utilizat decat actualul calendar Gregorian.

Einstein’s restricted theory of relativity, is bankrupt? Neutrinos beyond the speed of light in vacuum physics views

Einstein’s restricted theory of relativity, is bankrupt? Neutrinos beyond the speed of light in vacuum physics views
Researchers at CERN have measured the movement of subatomic particles, neutrinos, and found that he is traveling faster than light. Thursday according to press releases made by experts at CERN, a neutrino moving 186.282mile/secunda speed (299,792 km / second), above the speed of light in vacuum, write <a href = „http://www.physorg .com/news/2011-09-cern-faster-than-light-particle.html „target =” _blank „> Physorg </ a>.
Fota Einstein
Physicists at CERN want them checking results. James Gillies, spokesman for the European Organization for Nuclear Research, said that subatomic particles have traveled the distance of 454 miles (730 km) with a top speed speed of light in vacuum. As expected in the world of physics still no hurry to rewrite Einstein’s famous equation E = mc2. Yesterday took place the press conference and webcast open to the unexpected discovery about the experiment from Opera, by specialists from <a href = „http://indico.cern.ch/conferenceDisplay.py?confId=155620 „target =” _blank „> CERN </ a>. In the experiment performed in the CERN particle accelerator was launched over 15,000 neutrino particles, between Geneva and Gran Sassa, particles arriving at destination with 60 nanoseconds sooner than would have enough light, light speed exceeding the value of 0.0025 %. OPERA – Oscillation Project with Emulsion-Tracking Apparatus, believes the result checked repeatedly. Alvaro de lipstick from CERN commented: „If this study is confirmed, then we have not understood anything about anything, this result seems unbelievable.” John Ellis, another physicist at CERN, said: „before throwing it on Einstein at the stake, should be made an independent experiment.” Ereditato Antonio, said he had the same reaction of shock when he saw the results, adding that „after long time we discussed the results with my colleagues, I decided to publish them, because they are checked by other researchers.
CERN Photo
Reactions from scientists were not immediate. Physicist Alan Kostelecky of Indiana University who worked on this concept more than 25 years said „is a revolutionary breakthrough in case will be confirmed”.
Stephen Parke, Fermilab theorist, Chicago said that „new revelation is a shock, and will cause new problems if it is true”. Even if these results are confirmed, they will not change at all how we live or how the world works. This finding will fundamentally alter our understanding of how the universe works, is the opinion of all physicists. „Physics is based on Einstein’s famous formula, the basis for modern physics, and has been perfect so far,” said John Ellis of CERN. Neutrinos went on the 700 km to 60 nanoseconds faster than light, calculated error margin is 10 nanoseconds (one nanosecond = one billionth of a second). Fermilab have accomplished in 2007 a similar experiment, reaching comparable results. Physicist Brian Greene at Columbia University, believes the theory neutrinos can move at different speeds depending on the energy they possess. Phillip Schewe director of the Maryland Institute for Quantum said its own antiparticle studied for neutrino and the Sun. Jenny Thomas, professor of physics at University College London said that „there must be a simpler explanation for the interpretation of European results.” Overseas specialists from Fermilab researchers will attempt to verify the results from CERN, wanting to repeat measurements for neutrinos. Drew Baden, chairman of the department of physics at the University of Maryland, said that „it is more likely CERN results stem from measurement errors because neutrinos are difficult to follow.” In the same year, the results of an experiment conducted by researchers from NASA together with those of Stanford University, California have confirmed with great precision the two postulates of Albert Einstein. Called Gravity Probe target=”_blank”> <a href=” http://einstein.stanford.edu/&#8221; B </ a>, this experiment, one of the longest experiments conducted by NASA, the four gyroscopes used UTRA- accurate onboard a satellite to measure the effects of gravity theories. Einstein in 1905 issued two postulates, which constitute the starting point of the theory of relativity (special). The second postulate states that: the speed of light in vacuum has the same value in all inertial reference systems and in all directions, not depending on the movement of the light source or observer. Speed ​​of light in vacuum is the speed of transmission of any interactions, with the power value of 3×10 8 meters / second. But the French are less skeptical about the new discovery
„If true, this is a real bomb physics,” says Thibault Damour, Einstein’s relativity specialist of the IHES, Institut des Hautes Etudes Scientifiques in BURES-sur-Yvette, write <a target = „_blank”> LeFigaro </ a>. This has brought up the team of researchers at the INSA results-Nuclera Physics Institute in Lyon, on superluminal neutrinos. Stavros Katsanevas, Deputy Director of IN2P3 – National Institute of Nuclear Physics and particle physics at the CNRS, said the colleagues at CERN have hoped to deceive the outcome, but still not found the crack in the experiment. thorough study of physics at Lyoan has already been published on <a href = „. http: / / http://www.cnrs.fr / fr / pdf / neutrino.pdf „target =” _blank „> arXiv-CNRS </ a>. It looked French experts is that nothing is inconceivable, as there are no taboos in science theory, PHYSICAL there beyond the crest of Einstein, speeding resulted in the OPERA experiment is too big to be true, says <a target = „_blank”> LePoint </ a>. Most physicists, argue that it is almost certainly a mistake on the measurement. Alan Kostelecky, a theorist at Indiana University, commented: „an old adage of physics say that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, „wrote <a target = „_blank”> Sciencemag </ a>. Chang Kee Jung, Stony Brook University in New York said: „I can bet that it is a systematic study ,…, mistake I would bet the house that’s what it is. „recovery would be interesting experiments in the 1980s, about the” twin photons „, which consists of the issuance of two photons, two different directions from the same source, since this is a coupling of the particles, and review” quantum coherence „, which Einstein said specticism about” ghost action at a distance. „My opinion on this new experiment at CERN, is that it comes to neutrino and lepton especially associated transformation, and / or antiparticle appropriate, or the fourth type of neutrino netedetectat, like the Fermi Lab MiniBooNE 2002, or at the LANL, Los Alamos National Laboratory. Thus a critical review of the notions of space and time, based on an analysis of the facts experimental and theoretical physics available to today, will develop new theories.
<iframe frameborder=”0″ width=”480″ height=”270″ src=”http://www.dailymotion.com/embed/video/xl97ha”&gt; </ iframe> <br /> <a href = ” http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xl97ha_plus-vite-que-la-lumiere_tech „target =” _blank „> Plus que cattle in the world? </ a> <i> <a href =” http : / / http://www.dailymotion.com / sciencesetavenir „target =” _blank „> sciencesetavenir </ a> </ i>

my views
The strange behavior of subatomic particle scale
… Quantum physics equations can describe the events at macroscopic, microscopic conceptually. Proposal for experiment (seek funding …) – exp. Photons couple, who keeps regular contact. Although emitted in different directions, the same source, say a laser beam, moving them through an optical fiber, … photons are twins. They can switch instantly to another one .. consequences: 1. TRS bankruptcy because information can not be transmitted faster than the speed would be desirable.

big labs to experience the hard particle coupling. Quantum allows fusion energy parameters for 2 particles cuantica.2-coherent. contradiction with Heisenberg, for it is considered that it is impossible to determine all the parameters of cvasiparticule … as they say when the issue can measure particle 2 by subtracting that of particle 1.
It can show instant pertubarea particle … 1 … 2 … so many other specialized sites

 

le debutul de la fin pour l’énigme de la fresque perdue de Léonard de Vinci: La Bataille d’Anghiari

C’est peut-être le debutul de la fin pour l’énigme de la fresque perdue de Léonard de Vinci: La Bataille d’Anghiari. Laser, Camera infrarouge et faisceaux de neutroni vont être utiliseez par  Maurizio Seracini et ses collègues de l’Université de San Diego.

La Bataille d’Anghiari est l’une des oeuvres mythiques de Léonard de Vinci. Il s’agissait d’une celebrare de la Victoire de contre Florenta Milano, en 1440, qui avait été commandée à Léonard en 1504 par Piero Soderini, dignitaire Haut de la République de Florenţa, en meme temps que Celle de la Bataille de Cascina à Michel-Ange, au debut du 16 ième siècle. Les Deux géniaux, qui sine détestaient, étaient en Competition dans la Salle des 500, une des Salles de princes du Palazzo Vecchio ou sine réunissaient les notabili de Florenţa.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v0NKsdFW8O0&feature=player_embedded

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Culture de la complexité. Science de la complexité/ Culture of complexity. Complexity science

L’éducation moderne devrait stimuler et à éduquer l’esprit créatif, capable d’appliquer des méthodes heuristiques pour stimuler la créativité et de souplesse forme de pensée, de générer des solutions originales, de grande valeur et d’efficacité. S’agissant du renseignement „in house” au plus haut niveau est et sera un objectif primordial pour l’enseignement roumain. L’existence humaine, la vie en général, implique le développement de relations multiples et complexes, les évaluations à différents niveaux exige une activité d’ordre supérieur pensée qui est grandement facilitée stimulé toutes les sciences. La meilleure approche pour la personnalité humaine, la structure du modèle et son développement est dynamique structurelle et systémique-relationnelle. Un tel modèle d’intégration synthétise la perspective de la psychologie (intra) et psychosociales (relationnelles, les relations interpersonnelles), entre l’approche du procès-structurales et dynamiques.

Bien qu’il soit plus proche de „25 ans d’existence» (1987 – Santa Fe) science de la complexité n’est pas vu la vraie valeur, ou de l’importance scientifique que l’ouverture ou pragmatique. Une cause possible est qu’il exige de ceux qui l’approche de la complexité d’un changement de perspective que «la» réalité, une approche «holistique» (globale, contextuelle, intégrée), différente de la «réductionniste», précise le paradigme actuel. En d’autres termes, le faible niveau de diffusion de cette science n’est pas seulement due à la nouveauté de l’information elle-même: la géométrie fractale, théorie du chaos, la synergie, etc algorithme génétique. mais la perspective dans laquelle elles doivent être considérées, intégrée et valorisée. Traditionnellement, un troisième cycle de développement comporte l’ajout d’un nouveau chapitre à une base existante conceptuel. Opération, «métalangage» (paradigme) qui permet l’assemblage et l’intégration de l’information nouvellement acquise reste inchangé. Pour cette raison, nous pouvons dire que, fondamentalement, toute formation de spécialistes dans des cours de formation n’est qu’une expansion quantitative des connaissances existantes. Les difficultés ont continué spécialistes prefecţionarea se produisent généralement lorsque un changement de paradigme lui-même, parce que, comme une nouvelle classe d’information est nécessaire pour donner un sens à la profondeur de la restructuration initial de la perception, les coûts, expert fonctionnement neuronal.
Sinon, il est une première étape nécessaire pour s’adapter au nouveau paradigme, suivie de l’accumulation de nouvelles connaissances dans le domaine et ensuite seulement par le développement innovant de création en phase axée sur de nouveaux produits et services de nouvelles visions. Ce processus prend du temps et des efforts personnels que peu de gens sont maintenant prêts à le faire.
Dans le même temps, il est connu que la „diffusion” nouvelle société nécessite un certain temps (la conception d’un langage approprié, de l’opinion vis-à-vis du degré de compréhensibilité et l’utilité de la nouvelle approche, de nouvelles techniques ou technologies). Cette fois, outre la nouveauté de lui-même (les „composants”) est ajouté et la nécessité d’une approche holistique – par opposition à la mentalité actuelle des «désirs» de simplifier et d’isoler les problèmes à être perçue et traitée avec «facile». En conséquence, il est prévu que la science de la complexité temps de propagation dans la société d’être grand.
       La difficulté réside dans l’acceptation de l’approche de la complexité du groupe comme une entité capable de fonctionner sur la complexité. Capacité de comprendre et d’apprécier la science de la complexité est vraiment la vision de la propriété du groupe de propriété synergique „né” dans l’interaction particulière d’individus, bien formés dans différents domaines et travailler à l’intégration des informations traitées au-delà de la discipline dans laquelle dérivés. En d’autres termes, on peut rien savoir de la théorie du chaos ou la théorie des catastrophes, mais ne peut pas fonctionner au niveau de complexité. Dans cette perspective, face à la complexité fait partie des exercices imposés „Transformation” essence „du moteur qui anime l’individu et la société, à savoir la transition de la concurrence (la société industrielle, société de l’information) au CO (société de la connaissance, tel que défini dans le document Lisbonne).
„Un système complexe peut propriétés manifeste qui ne peut pas vraiment être expliqué en détail que l’étude des composants. Tous d’une manière totalement non-statistiques, peuvent se manifester des propriétés émergentes, une des propriétés collectives qui n’ont aucune signification dans la dynamique des parties. En d’autres termes, tout a ses propres lois que le printemps des parties et la dynamique qui se manifestent aussi longtemps que le tout n’est pas fragmentée en une approche réductionniste classique. ”
Approche interdisciplinaire tend à être un principe fondamental de la science contemporaine et un système d’éducation moderne.
Marcus Salomon depuis 1981, a déclaré que „les problèmes mondiaux du monde contemporain ne peuvent être résolus que par une approche interdisciplinaire centrée sur les valeurs humaines.”
Une telle interdisciplinarité est une façon d’organiser les contenus d’apprentissage, avec des implications pour toute la stratégie de conception de programmes qui offre une image unifiée des phénomènes et des processus étudiés dans l’éducation disciplinede diverses, et de faciliter la contextualisation et l’application des connaissances dans des situations différentes la vie.
Comme pré-requis pour promouvoir l’éducation interdisciplinaire, nous pouvons citer:
• l’interdisciplinarité peut être réalisé dans le cadre du système éducatif, en tenant compte des circonstances et de la situation;
disciplinarité interdisciplinarité • n’annule pas, mais essayez d’éliminer les frontières artificielles établies entre les différentes matières;
• Il est facilitée par l’existence de sujets susceptibles d’être traités interdisciplinaire;
• Création et expansion de la frontière de la recherche scientifique multidisciplinaire et epistemiologiei développement a révélé les limites des connaissances scientifiques monodisciplinaires.
Les niveaux de contenu d’apprentissage interdisciplinaire implique:
• approche interdisciplinaire des zones voisines;
• un traitement interdisciplinaire des problèmes;
• Transfert de connaissances ou les méthodes ou stratégies de recherche scientifique (méthode d’analyse systémique);
• le transfert de concepts, en valorisant et en connotations valence d’un concept dans différents champs du savoir (entropie).
Cela nécessite une interdisciplinarité éducation moderne, en réexaminant les compétences à évaluer, en mettant en œuvre les dernières méthodes et outils pédagogiques.
Elle est facilitée par le nouveau programme car elle corrige plusieurs disciplines des objectifs communs et leur réalisation, sont soumis à des objectifs opérationnels pour l’enseignement.

 

 

 
Culture of complexity. Complexity science
Modern education should stimulate and educate the creative mind, capable of applying heuristic methods to stimulate creative and flexible way of thinking, generating creative solutions, high value and efficiency. Regarding intelligence „in house” at the highest level is and will be a primary objective for the Romanian education. Human existence, life in general, involves the development of multiple and complex assessments at different levels requires higher order thinking activity that is stimulated greatly facilitated all the sciences. The best approach to human personality, the model structure and its development is dynamic structural and systemic-relational. Such an integration model synthesizes the perspective of psychology (intra) and psychosocial (relational, interpersonal), between the approach of trial-and structural dynamics.

Although it is closer to „25 years of existence” (1987 – Santa Fe) Complexity science is not seen the true value, or scientific importance that the opening or pragmatic. A possible cause is that it requires those who approach the complexity of a change of perspective that „the” reality, a „holistic” (global, contextual, integrated), different from the „reductionist,” says the current paradigm . In other words, the low level of dissemination of this knowledge is not only due to the newness of the information itself: the fractal geometry, chaos theory, synergy, etc. genetic algorithm. but the prospect in which they must be considered, integrated and valued. Traditionally, a third development cycle involves adding a new chapter to an existing database conceptual. Operation „metalanguage” (paradigm) that allows assembly and integration of newly acquired information remains unchanged. For this reason, we can say that, basically, any training of specialists in training courses is a quantitative expansion of existing knowledge. The difficulties continued  specialists usually occur when a change of paradigm itself, because, as a new class of information is necessary to make sense of the depth of the initial restructuring of perception, costs, expert neuronal function.
Otherwise, it is a necessary first step to adapt to the new paradigm, followed by the accumulation of new knowledge in the field and then only by the creation of innovative development phase focuses on new products and services to new visions. This process takes time and personal effort that few people are now willing to do.
At the same time, it is known as the „broadcast” new society requires a certain time (the design of appropriate language, opinion vis-à-vis the degree of understandability and usefulness of the new approach, new techniques or technologies). This time, besides the novelty of itself („components”) is added and the need for a holistic approach – as opposed to the current mindset of „wants” to simplify and isolate the problems to be perceived and treated with „easy”. Accordingly, it is expected that the science of complexity propagation time in the company to be great.
       The difficulty lies in accepting the approach of the complexity of the group as an entity capable of operating on the complexity. Ability to understand and appreciate the science of complexity is really the vision of property ownership group synergistic „born” in the interaction of particular individuals, trained in different fields and work on the integration of information processed beyond the discipline in which derivatives. In other words, we can know anything about chaos theory or catastrophe theory, but can not operate at the level of complexity. In this perspective, given the complexity is part of the exercises imposed „Transformation” essence „of the engine that drives the individual and society, namely the transition from competition (industrial society, information society) CO ( knowledge society, as defined in the document Lisbon).
„A complex system can manifest properties that can not really be explained in detail that the study of components. All in a totally non-statistical, can exhibit emergent properties, a collective properties that have no meaning in the dynamics of the parties. In other words, everything has its own laws that spring from the parties and the dynamics that occur as long as everything is fragmented into a classical reductionist approach. ”
Interdisciplinary approach tends to be a fundamental principle of contemporary science and a modern education system.
Marcus Solomon since 1981, said that „global problems of the contemporary world can be solved only through an interdisciplinary approach focusing on human values.”
Such interdisciplinarity is a way to organize learning content, with implications for the whole strategy of designing programs that offer a unified picture of the phenomena and processes studied in various disciplined education, and facilitate the contextualization and application of knowledge in different situations of life.
As a prerequisite to promote interdisciplinary education, we can mention:
• interdisciplinarity can be achieved through the education system, taking into account the circumstances and situation;
disciplinarity • interdisciplinarity does not cancel, but try to eliminate the artificial boundaries drawn between different subjects;
• It is facilitated by the existence of issues could be addressed interdisciplinary;
• Creating and expanding the frontiers of multidisciplinary scientific research and development epistemiologiei revealed the limits of scientific knowledge monodisciplinary.
Content levels of interdisciplinary learning involves:
• interdisciplinary approach to the surrounding areas;
• an interdisciplinary problems;
• Transfer of knowledge or methods or strategies for scientific research (method of systems analysis);
• the transfer of concepts, and enhance and valence connotations of a concept in different fields of knowledge (entropy).
This requires an interdisciplinary modern education, reviewing the skills to assess, by implementing the latest methods and tools.
It is facilitated by the new program because it addresses several disciplines common goals and achieve them, are subject to operational objectives for teaching.

in memory of one who was an academician Mihai Draganescu – A quantum theory of mentality?

in memory of one who was an academician Michael Draganescu

OR IS NOT POSSIBLE A quantum theory of mentality?
Mihai Draganescu
Romanian Academy
In recent years, cognitive science has shown an important controversy over the idea to turn to quantum physics to explain mental phenomena. The main promoters of a pro-quantum current thinking is Roger Penrose (1989, 1994), Henry P. Stapp (1993), Stuart R. Hameroff (1994), and K. Yasu Jibu M. (1996) [1].
And reactions have occurred but which denies the quantum nature or role in the manifestation of quantum physics and explain mental phenomena and consciousness. For example, Gregory R. Mulhauser, Department of Philosophy University of Glasgow in Scotland, following its analysis [2], believe that the traits of quantum mechanics are extremely relevant to the production and explanation of mental phenomena. He entitled his study of his, which I referenced,”On the End of a Quantum Mechanical Romance”[2]. It also states that there can be no role in influencing the outcome of constiinþei quantum event.
Kirk Ludwig, Department of Philosophy, University of Florida, Gainesville, USA, does not see why, in classical physics and quantum physics would be a difference in the relation between body and mind [3]. He says:
The problem”is generated by a group of sentences, all with strong motivation, but which together are inconsistent:
1. Some items have mental properties.
2. Fundamental constituents of objects (ie objects registered with particle physics) have mental properties.
3. Mental properties are not conceptually reducible to the properties or definition of non-mental objects.
4. Each feature of each object is deductible, a full description of them, according to pro-damentali constituents and properties and relationships between them. The problem is that of (2) – (4) deduce sentence denial (1). This problem is mind / body.”
In other words, if quantum physics contains no specific mental elements, just as classical physics does not contain, then the first is more right than his second serve to explaining mental processes. We return to these considerations.
David Chalmers, a mathematician at the origin, a professor of philosophy at the University of Santa Cruz, California, in a volume which aroused great interest [4], show that mental processes can not be explained by physics, including quantum mechanics, even so that Roger Penrose proposes to accommodate mental phenomena.
In two earlier statements I referred to the problems of Quantum Information processing and mental processing of information [1,5]. In both cases we have exposed a series of considerations on the possible role of quantum phenomena in light of authors who support the creation of a quantum theory of mind and consciousness.
Why quantum theories have been proposed to explain the mental processes? Undoubtedly, because all knowledge neurobiology, with all major developments that he knew, could not explain the most delicate phenomena of mental processes, for example the phenomena of intentionality and, in general, the phenomena called Qualia.
It is true, many believe the neurobiology of mental processes that all will be explained only by the structures neurobi-ology, but it is a conceptual view that extrapolate present achievements of science without any certainty or structural proper and thorough justification that this science will explain everything including mental processes fully.
Finally, faith that everything will be explained by structural science, which is based on the reality of nature’s fundamental forces, excluding all outside, is a philosophical point of view and not scientific. Recently observed:
”No doubt, mental processing of information defies structural scientist today. It would be very reassuring for science if the mind could be explained by structural knowledge”[6].
The only sure point of reference for mental treatment, the conceptual framework of structural science, offers a neurobiological brain reality because the mind can not occur without this reality. But it can not fully explain the mind.
Stapp [7,8] tries to treat the brain as a quantum system in which the specific mental processes occur when the brain wave function reduction [9]. But this would mean that at this moment to intervene something extra, beyond the known quantum mechanics. Stapp does not require this, considering that the reduction itself must also bring mental specificity. But how to intervene in a specific mental process without anything structural equations describing the quantum state before reducing to contain something which produces mental phenomena and then extract? Importantly, however, that in the face of the inability to explain the mind by classical physics, which is a tribute to the neurobiologists bodies should subscribe, Indre-fit Stapp their attention to a limit of quantum mechanics phenomenon, well known by anyone who has studied this little mechanics, quantum reduction. It works, after Stapp, quantum field on a brain. His theory is simplistic, but not convincing.
Penrose is a step further [10.11]. He shows that quantum mechanics can not explain the mental processes current information and any other non-computing specific mental phenomena by reducing the wave function in the way that quantum physics is known. He assumed that the brain, due to its structure, there is a reduction of the wave function in a new, unknown until now and which would need to produce that mental phenomenon. On the one hand, he proposes an extension of quantum physics, that today is considered insufficient to explain the mental processes. On the other hand, it suggests that structures which might cause this reduction would be mental quantum citoscheletu’s nerve fibers. Since it can not leave the physics and structural science, makes use of a new phenomenon that will bring resources to the mental, but resort to suggesting the effect of the gravitational field at this level and that would generate mental property.
But the gravitational field is structural and is subject to gravitational force today advanced theoretical unification process with the other three fundamental forces of nature. Why would then more mental”May”gravitational force than electromagnetic forces, weak and strong?
A quantum physical structure can not bring that something extra to fully explain the mental processes.
If from the very beginning we have taken into account the principle of insufficient structural stiinþei (Draganescu 1990, 1993) to explain the nature of living, mind, consciousness and nature of all reality, it would have had to say immediately that it is not possible in a quantum theory of mind the structural stiinþei.
Search for specific mental, in recent years, the level of quantum physics led to a threshold beyond which commits extension current knowledge. But such an extension within the domain structure can not be a solution, then the extension should exceed this area.
Meanwhile it emerged the possibility of a structural-phenomenological science, which, besides the fundamental physical forces, structural domain characteristic, take into account the physical and informational processes, hitherto ignored by science, which would form the basis of mental phenomena.
As you can see Kirk Ludwig, mentioned manner, allowing targets,
”In fact, of course, neither classical nor quantum physics does not attribute mental properties tali fundamental constituents of objects”[12].
The problem is to find not objects (particles) with mental properties, and any mental constituents, ingredients but in reality (the existing) who can take part in certain conditions the formation of objects with such properties. I noticed and pointed out that such ingredients could not be put in evidence the present structure of science because it is based on measurements of forces or ingredient participating in mental processes, by nature, coupled with structures other than by potential mental strength.
The fact that there is such an ingredient, meaning phenomenological, we demonstrated in my works of philosophy of science, and recently David Chalmers] 4], quite independently, it re-existing knowledge regarding it, rightly as one of the processes fundamental nature.
Returning now to the four points of Kirk Ludwig, set at the beginning of this paper, we find that assertions 1 (some items have mental properties) and 4 (each feature of each object is deductible, for a full description of them, depending on fundamental constituents and properties and re-grade of them) remain valid without modification.
Affirmation 2 (basic constituents of objects – objects that is registered with particle physics – not mental properties) should be restricted to basic structural constituents of the objects, that is exactly the world of elementary particles and forces between them. 2 becomes then the statement 2 statement. ”
The statement 3 (mental properties are not reducible to the concept or definition of non-mental properties) should be amended form,
3 ‘. Mental properties are not conceptually reducible to the properties or definition of non-mental structural objects. Under this form it says something indirectly that any structure without the addition of another order, can have mental properties. Therefore the set of statements before and still have to add another one,
5 ‘. Mental properties involve the participation of a fundamental ingredient of nature, the meaning of the phenomenological, which is not an atom of mentality, but a co-participants along with certain structures, to give birth to mental processes.
If Kirk Ludwig 1,2,3,4 assertions were inconsistent, reflecting the actual facts of science structural inconsistency in the form of affirmations 1.2 ‘, 3’, 4,5 ‘they become consistent. But this last set of statements are no longer included in stiinþa structures, but in a structural-phenomenological science. We will call the claims 1,2,3,4, the set of propositions structural Kirk Ludwig, and claims 1.2 ‘, 3’, 4,5 ‘as a structural-phenomenological Kirk Ludwig kit.
It may be noted that these sets of statements does not refer to a fundamental difference between classical physics and quantum physics. This does not mean that quantum physics can not play an essential role in mental processes. On the contrary, there is not excluded that the structural-phenomenological coupling needs to occur at the quantum level, as we have tried to suggest that since 1985. In this case, the extension of structural science in a structural-phenomenological science will be done by a structural-phenomenological quantum physics. This view coincides, as a general idea, with the one expressed by Roger Penrose on quantum physics need to expand, with the difference that does not stop, rightly in my opinion, the structural domain. Therefore, although the criticism of many authors can not give up the research quantum brain functioning landing / mind.
If a quantum theory of mind can not see the structural potential, in turn, a structural component fenomeno quantum-logic is possible for a theory of mind. Maybe it’s pretentious to establish a quantum theory of mind, given its neurobiological structural determination, which is still overwhelming, but the quantum plateau could be as important as the other levels (molecular, intraneuronic, interneurons, modular, integrator ).
Notes and References
1. References to their work see the Michael Draganescu, General Concepts and issues of quantum of information processing, Universi-tion „Politehnica” Bucharest, March 28, 1997, published in vol Role of Education and scientific research university in the development of the Society of Information, Bucharest, 1997 , p. 31-39.
2. Gregory L. Mulhauser, On the End of the Quantum Mechanical En-Mance, Psyche: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Consciousness, electronic journal, 2 (19), November, 1995, filename: psyche-95-2-19-decoherence 1-mulhauser.
3. Kirk Ludwig, Why the difference between Quantum and Classical Physics is irrelevant to the Mind / Body Problem, Psyche: an interdiscipli-Nary Journal of Research on Consciousness, electronic journal, 2 (16), September, 1995, filename: psyche-95- 2-16-2-qm_stapp Ludwig.
4. David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.
5. Michael Draganescu, mental processing of information, communication, Iasi Academic Days Oct. 9. 1997. Academic, oct.1997 (p.I-a), in November. 1997 (p.II-a), dec. 1997 (p.III-a).
6. Id.
7. H.P. Stapp, Mind, Matter, and Quqntum Mechanics, Berlin, Springer Verlag, 1993.
8. HPStapp, Why Classical Mechanics Can not Naturally Accommodate Consciousness But Quantum Mechanics Can, Psych, electronic journal, 2 (5), May 1995, Filename: psyche-95-2-1-05-qm_stapp Stapp.
9. An outline of these ideas see also note 5 in this paper.
10. Roger Penrose, Shadows of the Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994.
11. An outline of these ideas see also note 5 in this paper.
12. Kirk Ludwig, op.
Communication at the annual session of the Romanian Committee for History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, the Romanian Academy, enjoy you, 6 November 1997.
MENTALITY OF PHILOSOPHY IN SCIENCE

Romanian Academy
Introduction
Mind is a notion that refers to the mind, mental processes and states. Therefore one can rightly speak of a philosophy of mind, the phrase introduced by Angela Botez [1] by a Romanian-language adaptation of what in English is called „Philosophy of Mind.”
The question was asked in recent years is whether the mind and consciousness are not only objects of philosophy, but of science [2]. Undoubtedly, until now they have accumulated more knowledge elements in the scientific mind, in particular structural part of it, but if the mind has other than structural components, the advance of science in such an area that would exceed structuralul is extremely hard. However, today, combining elements can be philosophical and scientific theories of mind.
From the philosophical point of view, the mind can be approached either as a subfield of philosophy itself, either in a general philosophy of science.
the first case, a good presentation of this approach makes it a classic Jerome A. Schaffer [3] Encyclopedia Britannica (1994). In summary this study failed to show that „Philosophy of Mind” examines the concept of mind (mind) in relation to the concepts of matter, en ENERGY, human body and central nervous system. It is curious that it is not mentioned and the concept of information, although the author reserves a special paragraph artificial intelligence. A special attention is paid analysis of the mind, trying to find what is essential for mental phenomena: what the purpose (purposeful behavior), though real, is not retained as the essence of mentalu his intentionality, which, without deny the importance of a considered problematic for mental essence, subjective experience, which best characterizes the essence of mind. How subjective experience but is known only through introspection, Schaffer believes that might say: „A mental event is event inner year introspected That Can be.” Some complications arise, re know, because how introspection can be defined, which could hardly be said to define the concept before the mind. Facing so many problems, ultimately the author seems to sustain the sentence „mentality exists because there” because it’s hard „to overthrow beliefs about one’s present mental events, and perhaps this is All That One Needs to give the Criterion Force [ 4].
In the latter case, any general philosophy of science should include a philosophy of mind. This is the case with structural-phenomenological philosophy of science ortofizice.
Recent theories of mind and consciousness can be divided into three categories [5]
a. structural theories;
b. structural-phenomenological theories;
c. conception „misterianã [6] on the mind and consciousness.
In the latter case, knowledge is not possible to believe that mental phenomena, which are expected to be fully covered by a mystery.
Among recent structural theories can be mentioned those developed by Crick and Koch [7] G. Edelmann [8] Daniel C. Den – nett [9], Roger Penrose [10] to In the first three cases are present structural health neurobiological theories, that they fit into a class that Ted Honderich called the neural functionalism [11]. In Penrose’s case, which involved new theories is designing a landing operation involving physical quantum neurons in the cytoskeleton organization of neurons. Penrose’s theory remains, in my opinion [12], struc tural, and moreover that all current theories of neural functionalism.
Honderich says, rightly: „neural functionalism is not a conscious conception of the nature of the event itself” [13]. This is correct because structural science is insufficient to fully explain the nature of mental processes, the consiinþei, and life in general is limited, based on a fundamental principle [14,15,16] in terms of understanding the nature of existence whole.
A somewhat special case gives it to you John Searle whose position [17.18] is not structural or functional neural said. Actually, Ted Honderich clarifies things by saying the following:
„Searle is against reducþionismului and therefore insisted on the fact that our conscious events and pro perty were different from those that recognize functionalism neu ral .[…] But most have one thing to say and insist altceva.Este ASU PRA that the events themselves are not only aware of neural relationships and nothing to give them distinct concepts. Sky Our research centers show that Searle has failed to achieve such viziune.Nici one of the thirteen traits (volume of The Re Discovery of the Mind [17], n.ns.MD) and their sum or failed it. This proves that his position is consistent with real neural functionalism [19].
A new class of theories of mind is what we call a structural-phenomenological theories [5]. One of these theories, belonging to the author of this article is contained in ortofizicã philosophy of science [20], the other belongs to David Chalmers [21.22].
Some general considerations
I. For a theory of mental processes is obvious that a model of mind is not possible without simultaneous development of a model of existence in its totality. You can not examine a new eye, philosophical and scientific minds without a simultaneous review of all reality. Mental models go hand in hand with existing models [23].
II. Mental processes are living processes. One theory, philosophical or partly scientific, partly philosophical, „the mind is not possible without a theory of living nature.
Often artificial intelligence is considered as a mental process. This point of view, more abandoned, can not be sustained. If that were true, then the limit, and one would have any automatic mental process.
On the contrary, the artificial intelligence and intelligent robots with artificial bag can sustain some form of mental existence, not a mental psychic but a psychic information [24].
Returning to the connection between the living and mentally, if there is such a link, then begins to manifest mental process? From the complexity of organisms? Moreover, they also say the question when life becomes a structure [25]? One could argue that lower organisms are not mental processes, and they appear only in vertebrates, culminating in the human mind. It is true, says Harold Morowitz [26], the mind is a complex mental processes of reflective thinking to the property, but the basic thought process could be present at the most simple living entity. If structuralul will be exceeded in order to understand life and mind, then the economy of thought compels us to suspect that this over is done once for both phenomena.
III. To elucidate the nature of mind is a need for new physics. This is demonstrated and supported the philosophy ortofizicã also by Roger Penrose, although it proposes a new structural physics, and David Chalmers. And other authors think of a new physics, but not without arguments, the authors recall earlier documents. To forward to a new physics is not enough only philosophy of science. It is necessary to find one or several scientific benchmarks on such a new path, even if the rest will be filled with a plausible philosophical speculation, thus building stiinþifico-philosophical theories.
IV. From the moment you will find scientific milestones, in addition to those brought by the neo structural science [16] contemporary, but are insufficient, then proceed to step philosophy of mind, the scientific and philosophical theories that of mind.
I think those points of reference have also appeared.
The first one is that of finding the existence of a phenomenon „new” in kind, again because it was neglected, namely the „meaning of the phenomenological” [20.27] philosophy emphasized by the author ortofizice or experiential phenomenon „found in inde pendent, David Chalmers, are identical (as in the human mind mene phenomenon). Important is that this is not structural, with a special kind. Only he can explain the specificity of mind, which is struc tural-phenomenological nature. Moreover Chalmers in his show that experiential time is equivalent to the phenomenological [28].
If meaning is a phenomenological reality, and is and is not structural, yet he must have a physical medium. Phenomenological sense recognition involves the recognition of such support. In this way we introduced informaterie name for this support. Inevitably, it must be a reality.
If mental processes are based on structures, and here the great merit of neurobiology tervine of structural and phenomenological way, the temptation must be recognized and existing ways of coupling between structures and informaterie and between structural processes and the phenomenological. Equally inevitably, the structural-phenomenological coupling must be a reality.
More can be said with certainty Scientific. For example, the nature of this coupling can not be only speculation, but can offer theoretical approaches and models for the future, why not experimental.
Besides the three points above stiinþifice chalk, is involved in another one, namely how much inferarea supporting the existence of a deep substratum of all reality [20,29,30].
With these four points of support can not imagine the existence zonabile network models and correlated with these models mentalu’s. Philosophy of stiinþei ortofizicã represents such an attempt.
V. The transition from a purely structural stiinþã like that of today, from a structural-phenomenological seems very plausible. This shift will depend largely on the possibility of a corresponding change in methodology bility gia science to cope with the phenomenon nology processes.
Towards a structural-phenomenological theory of mind ortofizicã.
A comparison between the two theories fenomenolo structural-strategic issues was presented elsewhere [5].
The main elements of the theory of mind, resulting from ortofizicã philosophy of science, are as follows:
• Any structural-phenomenological interaction is a mental process. Any mental process has some structural and phenomenological part, but only urge their tion is a mental phenomenon.
• mental process is a characteristic of living, perhaps its essential feature.
• mental process is not possible without phenomenological. Fenomenologicului Nature is at once physical and informational, and is manifested by phenomenological way.
• mental process is informational in essence.
• structural-phenomenological coupling is not the structural natural forces, but in another way that science is bound to elucidate. He therefore could not be placed in obvious structural physics.
• structural-phenomenological coupling might involve quantum realitãtþii level, this ontological model appearing as required ortofizic [31]. This last resort to explain the mind, quantum level of reality that awaits many researchers have mind and consciousness, before being recalled most important of these, Roger Penrose, will not remain in structuralului. Will need a new quantum physics, structural tural-phenomenological, as an extension of quantum physics today struc tural.
• Meanwhile, the human mind has a macro character purpose. It comes in contact primarily with macro reality end, and constructs, as combinations of elementary particles or atoms become obvious macroscopic bodies, declared, only in this human body that reflects the mind.
• In your mind you can spend a merge between the macroscopic and microscopic quantum as a physical process and information, structural-phenomenological, very specific action that would provide integrated jectivity of mind, continuificarea internal and external reality, the phenomena of intuition and creativity to
• The mind is a complex mental processes, but they are grouped in the mental process and mental processor of natural language processors mental sensations, the intellect, the feelings of the will, memory, etc.. Each processor also is a mental process informa-tion technologies phenomenological structure. The mind is a complex mental process and mental processes [32].
• Each biological cell, or isolated or part of a multicellular organism, has ordered a mental activity, without having a mind full that combines all the necessary processors and mental processes. Elsewhere [33] we presented an abstract structural-phenomenological theory of a bi ology cells to reveal the possibility of such unconscious processes of your men.
• If each cell of the human body has the mental processes, the total human mind consists of the head brain (central nervous system) plus the body or mental processes [34].
• The brain contains the mind, body and mind contains all. We can not talk when your body and mind, or brain and mind as separate entities, but not identically equal.
Since deep analysis of the mental structure of the object begins with the mental processes, but can not be fulfilled without subjective process analysis, it should be noted how, in light of any structural-phenomenological theories, the last absolutely not subjective. They contain informa tion technologies and a physical object, as real processes, even though di rect can not be seen outside the body.
Another issue relates to the classical philosophy of mind is that of spatiality or nespatialitãtii mental phenomenon. Some philosophers of mind determine whether nespatial, nonlocalized of mind, which is not neîndreptãtit. But this may be true only for the phenomenological expression of the mental, for his part but not structural. Part of Mental lies in the brain, S-neurobiology (structural neurobiology) proves successful. Phenomenological side, the version of the theory of structural-phenomenological ortofizicã of mind is found in informaterie, which within itself is non-spatial, as all reality profound. SP-A neurobiological theory is found, probably twice the character and aspaþial space of the mind, but will note primordial dependence of mind and brain will say that the mind is found in the universe where there is space and the brain. Access them in a non-spatial area of reality can be a profound theme of study is not devoid of important feature.
End
In the present study were presented and considered several elements necessary for developing rations of a research program called „structural-phenomenological modeling, conceptual and symbolic” at the Center for Advanced Research in machine learning, Language Processing and Conceptual Modeling of the Romanian Academy. The program is broader than the modeling of mental processes, but one of his goals is also to achieving a structural-phenomenological theories of procedural selor ortofizice mind and consciousness.
A program and wider (KATEDRAST called after the name of the initiators), but which intersects with the enunciated above, with the intention to review the fundamentals of science, in general, was recently made by Professor Menas Kafatos, Professor Daniele Struppa, both from George Mason University, USA, Prof. Gheorghe Tecuci, from the same university and director of the Romanian Academy noted above, as well as author of the study.

ESTE SAU NU POSIBILÃ O TEORIE CUANTICÃ A MENTALULUI ?

Mihai Drãgãnescu

Academia Românã

In ultimii ani, în stiinta cognitiva s-a manifestat o controversã importantã asupra ideii de a se apela la fizica cuanticã pentru explicarea fenomenelor mentale. Promotorii principali ai unui curent de gândire pro-cuantic sunt Roger Penrose (1989, 1994), Henry P. Stapp (1993), Stuart R. Hameroff (1994), M. Jibu si K. Yasue (1996)[1].

Au apãrut însã si reactii prin care se neagã natura cuanticã sau rolul fizicii cuantice în manifestarea si explicarea fenomenelor mentale si ale constiintei. Spre exemplu, Gregory R. Mulhauser, de la Departamentul de filosofie al Universitãtii Glasgow din Scotia, în urma analizei sale[2], considerã cã trãsãturile mecanicii cuantice sunt extrem de nerelevante pentru producerea si explicarea fenomenelor mentale. El îsi intituleazã studiul sãu, la care am fãcut referintã, ’’On the End of a Quantum Mechanical Romance’’[2]. De asemenea, afirmã cã nu se poate acorda nici un rol constiinþei în influentarea rezultatului unui eveniment cuantic.

Kirk Ludwig, de la Departamentul de filosofie al Universitãtii din Florida, Gainesville, SUA, nu vede de ce între fizica clasicã si fizica cuanticã ar fi o diferentã în problema relatiei dintre corp si minte[3]. El afirmã:

’’ Problema este generatã de un grup de propozitii, toate având motivatii puternice, dar care împreunã sunt inconsistente:

1.      Unele obiecte au proprietãti mentale.

2.      Constituentii fundamentali ai obiectelor ( adicã obiectele înscrise în catalogul fizicii particulelor) nu au proprietãti mentale.

3.      Proprietãtile mentale nu sunt conceptual sau definitional reductibile la proprietãtile non-mentale ale obiectelor.

4.      Fiecare trãsãturã a fiecãrui obiect este deductibilã, într-o descriere completã a ei, în functie de constituentii fun- damentali si de proprietãtile si relatiile dintre acestia. Problema este aceea cã din (2)-(4) deducem negarea propozitiei (1). Aceasta este problema minte/corp’’.

Cu alte cuvinte, dacã fizica cuanticã nu contine elemente specifice mentalului, la fel cum nu contine fizica clasicã, atunci prima nu este mai îndreptãtitã decât a doua sã serveascã explicãrii proceselor mentale. Vom reveni asupra acestor consideratii.

David Chalmers, matematician la origine, profesor de filosofie la Universitatea Santa Cruz, California, într-un volum care a trezit un deosebit interes[4], aratã cã procesele mentale nu pot fi explicate de fizica actualã, inclusiv de mecanica cuanticã, nici chiar de aceea pe care Roger Penrose o propune pentru a acomoda fenomenele mentale.

În douã comunicãri anterioare m-am referit la problemele procesãrii cuantice ale informaþiei si la procesarea mentalã a informatiei[1,5]. In ambele cazuri am expus o serie de consideratii asupra rolului posibil al fenomenelor cuantice în lumina lucrãrilor autorilor care sustin constituirea unei teorii cuantice a mentalului si constiintei.

De ce s-au propus teorii cuantice pentru explicarea proceselor mentale? Fãrã îndoialã, datoritã faptului cã întreaga cunoastere neurobiologicã, cu toate progresele mari pe care le-a cunoscut, nu a putut explica fenomenele cele mai delicate ale proceselor mentale, spre exemplu fenomenele de intentionalitate si, în general, fenomenele denumite qualia.

Este adevãrat, multi neurobiologi cred cã toate procesele mentale se vor putea explica numai prin structurile neurobi- ologice, dar acesta este un punct de vedere care extrapoleazã conceptual succesele prezente ale stiintei structurale fãrã nici o certitudine sau temeinicã justificare cã aceastã stiintã va explica orice, inclusiv procesele mentale în mod deplin.

In cele din urmã, credinta cã totul se va explica prin stiinta structuralã, care se bazeazã pe realitatea fortelor fundamentale ale naturii, excluzând orice în afara acestora, este un punct de vedere filosofic si nu stiintific. Recent observam :

’’Fãrã îndoialã, procesarea mentalã a informatiei sfideazã stinta structuralã de astãzi. Ar fi foarte linistitor pentru stiintã dacã mentalul ar putea fi explicat prin cunoastere structuralã’’[6].

Singurul punct de reper sigur pentru tratarea mentalului, în cadrul conceptual al stiintei structurale, îl oferã realitatea neurobiologicã a creierului, deoarece mentalul nu se poate produce fãrã aceastã realitate. Dar ea nu poate explica mentalul în mod deplin.

Stapp[7,8] încearcã a trata creierul ca un sistem cuantic în care procesele cele mai specifice mentalului se produc în momentul reducerii functiei de undã a creierului[9]. Dar acest lucru ar însemna ca în acest moment sã intervinã ceva în plus, dincolo de mecanica cuanticã cunoscutã. Stapp nu presupune acest lucru, considerând cã reducerea în sine trebuie sã aducã si caracterul specific mentalului. Cum sã intervinã însã specificul mentalului într-un proces structural fãrã ca nimic în ecuatiile care descriu starea cuanticã dinainte de reducere sã continã ceva din care sã rezulte apoi extragerea fenomenului mental? Important este totusi faptul cã în faþa imposibilitãtii de a explica mentalul prin fizica clasicã, ceea ce este o mãrturie la care neurobiologii structurali ar trebui sã subscrie, Stapp îsi îndre- aptã atentia asupra unui fenomen limitã al mecanicii cuantice, foarte cunoscut de oricine a studiat putin aceastã mecanicã, reducerea cuanticã. Aceasta actioneazã, dupã Stapp, asupra unui câmp cuantic al creierului. Teoria sa nu este simplistã, dar nici convingãtoare.

Penrose face un pas mai departe[10,11]. El aratã cã mecanica cuanticã actualã nu poate explica procesele mentale informationale non-computationale si nici celelalte fenomene mentale specifice prin reducerea functiei de undã în modul în care este cunoscutã de fizica cuanticã. El presupune cã în creier, datoritã structurii acestuia, are loc o reducere a functiei de undã într-un mod nou, necunoscut pânã acum, si care ar aduce acel necesar pentru producerea fenomenului mental. Pe de o parte, el propune o extindere a fizicii cuantice, aceea de astãzi fiind consideratã insuficientã pentru explicarea proceselor mentale. Pe de altã parte, el sugereazã cã structurile unde s-ar putea produce aceastã reducere cuanticã mentalã ar fi fibrele citoscheletu- lui neuronilor. Deoarece nu poate pãrãsi cadrul fizicii si stiintei structurale, nu face apel la un fenomen nou care sã aducã resurse pentru mental, ci recurge la sugerarea efectului câmpului gravitational la acest nivel si care ar avea proprietatea generãrii mentalului.

Dar câmpul gravitational este structural, iar forta gravitationalã este supusã astãzi procesului teoretic avansat de unificare cu celelalte trei forte fundamentale ale naturii. De ce ar fi atunci mai ’’mai mentalã’’ forta gravitationalã decât fortele electromagnetice, slabe si tari?

O fizicã cuanticã structuralã nu poate aduce acel ceva în plus pentru a explica deplin procesele mentale.

Dacã de la bun început am fi tinut cont de principiul insuficientei stiinþei structurale (Drãgãnescu 1990, 1993) pentru explicarea naturii viului, mentalului, constiintei si naturii întregii realitãti, atunci ar fi trebuit sã afirmãm imediat cã nu este posibilã o teorie cuanticã a mentalului în cadrul stiinþei structurale.

Cãutarea specificului mentalului, în ultimii ani, la nivelul fizicii cuantice, a dus la un prag care obligã extinderea acesteia dincolo de cunoasterea actualã. Dar cum o extindere în interiorul domeniului structural nu poate fi o solutie, atunci extinderea trebuie sã depãseascã acest domeniu.

Între timp s-a conturat si posibilitatea unei stiinte structural-fenomenologice, care, în afarã de forþele fizice fundamentale, caracteristice pentru domeniul structural, sã tinã seama de procese fizice si informationale, neglijate de stiintã pânã acum, care sã stea la baza fenomenelor mentale.

Dupã cum observã Kirk Ludwig, mentionat mai îna- inte,

’’De fapt, desigur, nici fizica clasicã si nici cea cuanticã nu atribuie proprietãti mentale constituentilor fundamen- tali ai obiectelor’’[12].

Problema este aceea de a gãsi nu obiecte (particule) cu proprietãti mentale, si nici constituenti mentali, ci ingredienti în realitate (în existentã) care sã poatã participa în anumite conditii la constituirea de obiecte cu asemenea proprietãti. Am remarcat si subliniat faptul cã asemenea ingredienti nu au putut fi pusi în evidentã de stiinta actualã structuralã deoarece aceasta se bazeazã pe mãsurãtori de forte, ori ingredientul participant la procese mentale, prin natura sa, cupleazã altfel cu structurile potential mentale decât prin forte.

Faptul cã existã un asemenea ingredient, sensul fenomenologic, l-am demonstrat în lucrãrile mele de filosofia stiintei, iar recent David Chalmers]4], cu totul independent, îi re- cunoaste existenta, considerându-l, în mod îndreptãtit ca unul din procesele fundamentale ale naturii.

Revenind acum la cele 4 puncte ale lui Kirk Ludwig, expuse la începutul acestei lucrãri, constatãm cã afirmaþiile 1 (unele obiecte au proprietãþi mentale) si 4 ( fiecare trãsãturã a fiecãrui obiect este deductibilã, dintr-o descriere completã a ei, în functie de constituentii fundamentali si de proprietãtile si de re- latiile dintre acestia) rãmân valabile fãrã modificare.

Afirmaþia 2 ( constituentii fundamentali ai obiectelor – adicã obiectele înscrise în catalogul fizicii particulelor – nu au proprietãti mentale) trebuie restrânsã la constituentii structurali fundamentali ai obiectelor, adicã exact la lumea particulelor elementare si a fortelor dintre ele. Afirmatia 2 devine atunci afirmatia 2’.

Afirmatia 3 ( Proprietãtile mentale nu sunt conceptual sau definitional reductibile la proprietãti non-mentale) trebuie amendatã sub forma,

3’. Proprietãtile mentale nu sunt conceptual sau definitional reductibile la proprietãtile non-mentale ale obiectelor structurale. Sub aceastã formã se afirmã indirect cã orice structurã fãrã altceva în plus, de alt ordin, nu poate avea proprietãti mentale. De aceea setului de afirmatii de mai înainte trebuie sã i se mai adauge încã una,

5’. Proprietãtile mentale implicã participarea unui ingredient fundamental al naturii, sensul fenomenologic, care nu este un atom de mentalitate, ci un coparticipant alãturi de anumite structuri, pentru a da naºtere proceselor mentale.

Dacã afirmaþiile lui Kirk Ludwig 1,2,3,4, erau inconsistente, reflectând de fapt inconsistenta realã a stiintei structurale, sub forma afirmatiilor 1,2’,3’,4,5’ ele devin consistente. Dar acest ultim set de afirmatii nu se mai înscrie în stiinþa structuralã, ci într-o stiintã structural-fenomenologicã. Vom numi afirmatiile 1,2,3,4, setul structural de propozitii Kirk Ludwig, iar afirmatiile 1,2’,3’, 4,5’ drept setul structural-fenomenologic Kirk Ludwig.

Se poate observa cã aceste seturi de afirmatii fundamentale nu se referã la o deosebire dintre fizica clasicã si fizica cuanticã. Acest lucru nu înseamnã cã fizica cuanticã nu poate juca un rol esential în procesele mentale. Din contrã, nu este de loc exclus ca necesarul cuplaj structural-fenomenologic sã se producã la nivel cuantic, dupã cum am încercat sã sugerez încã din anul 1985. In acest caz, extinderea stiintei structurale într-o stiintã structural-fenomenologicã se va face printr-o fizicã cuanticã structural-fenomenologicã. Acest punct de vedere coincide, ca idee generalã, cu acela exprimat de Roger Penrose referitor la necesitatea extinderii fizicii cuantice, cu deosebirea cã nu se opreste, în mod întemeiat dupã pãrerea mea, la domeniul structural. De aceea,cu toate criticile aduse de multi autori, nu se poate renunta la cercetarea palierului cuantic al functionãrii creierului/mintii.

Dacã o teorie cuanticã structuralã a mentalului nu o vedem posibilã, în schimb, o componentã cuanticã structural-fenomeno- logicã apare posibilã pentru o teorie a mentalului. Poate este pretentios sã se instituie o teorie cuanticã a mentalului, având în vedere determinarea structuralã neurobiologicã a acestuia, care este totusi covârsitoare, dar palierul cuantic ar putea fi la fel de important ca si celelalte paliere ( molecular, intraneuronic, interneuronic, modular, integrator).

Note si referinte bibliografice

1. Referinte bibliografice la lucrãrile acestora vezi în Mihai Drãgãnescu, Concepte generale si probleme cuantice ale procesãrii informatiei, Universi- tatea “Politehnica” Bucureºti, 28 martie 1997, publicatã în vol. Rolul Invãþãmântului si al Cercetãrii stiintifice universitare în dezvoltarea Societãþii Informationale, Bucuresti, 1997, p. 31-39.

2. Gregory L. Mulhauser, On the End of a Quantum Mechanical Ro- mance, PSYCHE: an interdisciplinary journal of research on consciousness, electronic journal, 2 (19), November, 1995, filename: psyche-95-2-19- decoherence-1-mulhauser.

3. Kirk Ludwig, Why the difference between Quantum and Classical Physics is irrelevant to the Mind/Body Problem, PSYCHE: an interdiscipli- nary journal of research on consciousness, electronic journal, 2 (16), September, 1995, filename: psyche-95-2-16-qm_stapp-2 ludwig.

4. David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.

5. Mihai Drãgãnescu, Procesarea mentalã a informatiei, comunicare, Zilele Academice Iesene, 9 oct. 1997. Academica, oct.1997(p.I-a), nov. 1997 (p.II-a),dec. 1997 (p.III-a).

6. Idem.

7. H.P. Stapp, Mind, Matter, and Quqntum Mechanics, Berlin, Springer Verlag, 1993.

8. H.P.Stapp, Why Classical Mechanics Cannot Naturally Accommodate Consciousness but Quantum Mechanics Can, PSYCHE, electronic journal, 2(5), May 1995, Filename: psyche-95-2-05-qm_stapp-1-stapp.

9. O prezentare a acestor idei vezi si în lucrarea de la nota 5.

10. Roger Penrose, Shadows of the Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994.

11. O prezentare a acestor idei vezi si în lucrarea de la nota 5.

12. Kirk Ludwig, op.cit.

Comunicare la Sesiunea anuala a Comitetului Român pentru Istoria si Filosofia Stiintei si Tehnicii, Academia Româna, Bucur- esti, 6 noiembrie 1997.

DE LA FILOSOFIA LA STIINTA MENTALULUI

Mihai Drãgãnescu

Academia Românã

Introducere

Mentalul este o notiune care se referã la minte, procese si stãri mentale. De aceea se poate vorbi în mod îndreptãtit de o filosofie a mentalului, sintagmã introdusã de Angela Botez[1] printr-o adaptare în limba românã a ceea ce în limba englezã se numeste „Philosophy of Mind”.

Intrebarea care s-a pus în ultimii ani este aceea dacã mentalul si constiinta sunt obiecte nu numai ale filosofiei, ci si ale stiintei[2]. Fãrã îndoialã, pânã în prezent s-au acumulat multe elemente stiintifice în cunoasterea mentalului, în special pentru partea structuralã a acestuia, dar dacã mentalul are si alte componente decât cele structurale, înaintarea stiintei într-un asemenea domeniu care ar depãsi structuralul se face extrem de greu. Totusi, astãzi, îmbinând elemente filosofice si stiintifice se pot constitui teorii ale mentalului.

Din punct de vedere filosofic, mentalul poate fi abordat fie ca un subdomeniu în sine al filosofiei, fie în cadrul unei filosofii generale a stiintei.

pentru primul caz , o bunã prezentare a acestui mod clasic de abordare o face Jerome A. Schaffer[3] în Enciclopedia Britanicã (1994). In acest reusit studiu de sintezã se aratã cã „Philosophy of Mind” studiazã conceptul de minte (mind) în relatie cu conceptele de materie, en ergie, corp uman si sistem nervos central. Este curios faptul cã nu este mentionat si conceptul de informatie, desi autorul rezervã un paragraf special inteligentei artificiale. O atentie deosebitã este acordatã analizei caracteristicilor mentalului, cu intentia de a gãsi ceea ce este esenþial pentru fenomenul mental: comportamentul cu scop (purposeful behaviour) , care desi real, nu este retinut ca esentã a mentalu lui; intentionalitatea , pentru care, fãrã a-i nega importanta, o considerã problematicã pentru a fi esenta mentalului; experienþa subiectivã , care ar caracteriza cel mai bine esenta mentalului. Cum însã experienta subiectivã este cunoscutã numai prin introspectie, Schaffer considerã cã s-ar putea afirma: ” A mental event is an inner event that can be introspected”. Unele complicatii apar, re cunoaste, datoritã modului în care poate fi definitã introspectia, care cu greu ar putea fi precizatã ca notiune înainte de a defini mentalul. In fata atâtor probleme, în cele din urmã autorul pare sã sustinã teza „mentalul existã pentru cã existã”, deoarece este greu ” to overthrow beliefs about one’s present mental events;and perhaps this is all that one needs to give the criterion force”[4].

In al doilea caz, orice filosofie generalã a stiintei, trebuie sã cuprindã si o filosofie a mentalului . Acesta este si cazul filosofiei structural-fenomenologice ortofizice a stiintei.

Teoriile recente ale mentalului si constiintei pot fi divizate în trei categorii[5]:

a. teorii structurale;

b. teorii structural-fenomenologice;

c. concepþia „misterianã „[6] asupra mentalului si constiintei.

In ultimul caz, se considerã cã nu este posibilã cunoasterea fenomenelor mentale, acestea fiind considerate a fi acoperite de un mister deplin.

Dintre teoriile structurale recente pot fi amintite cele elaborate de Crick si Koch[7]; G. Edelmann[8]; Daniel C. Den- nett[9], Roger Penrose[10] s.a. În primele trei cazuri sunt prezen tate teorii structurale neurobiologice, respectiv ele se încadreazã în clasa pe care Ted Honderich o numeste a functionalismului neural[11]. In cazul lui Penrose, ceea ce intervine nou este schitarea unei teorii care implicã functionarea palierului cuantic fizic la nivelul citoscheletului neuronilor dintr-o organizare de neuroni. Teoria lui Penrose rãmâne, dupã opinia mea[12], struc turalã, ca de altfel si toate teoriile actuale ale functionalismului neural.

Honderich afirmã, în mod îndreptãtit: ” functionalismul neural nu reprezintã o conceptie asupra naturii evenimentului constient în sine”[13] . Acest lucru este corect deoarece stiinta structuralã este insuficientã pentru a explica natura completã a proceselor mentale, a consiinþei, a vietii si, în general, este limitatã, în baza unui principiu fundamental[14,15,16], în privinta întelegerii naturii existentei în totalitatea ei.

Un caz oarecum aparte îl oferã John Searle a cãrui pozi tie[17,18] nu este declarat structuralã sau functional neuralã. De altfel, Ted Honderich clarificã lucrurile afirmând urmãtoarele:

” Searle se declarã împotriva reducþionismului si de aceea insistã si asupra faptului cã evenimentele noastre constiente au si pro prietãti diferite de cele pe care le recunoaste functionalismul neu ral.[…]Dar, mai trebuie spus si altceva.Este un lucru sã insisti asu pra faptului cã evenimentele constiente în sine nu sunt numai relatii neurale si altceva sã oferi o conceptie distinctã asupra lor. Cer cetarea noastrã aratã cã Searle nu a reusit sã realizeze o astfel de viziune.Nici una din cele treisprezece trãsãturi (din volumul The Re discovery of Mind[17] ,n.ns.M.D.) si nici suma lor nu au reusit asa ceva. Astfel cã pozitia sa realã se dovedeste consistentã cu functionalismul neural”[19].

O clasã nouã de teorii ale mentalului o reprezintã ceea ce numim teoriile structural-fenomenologice [5]. Una din aceste teorii, apartinând autorului acestui articol, este cuprinsã în filosofia ortofizicã a stiintei[20], cealaltã apartine lui David Chalmers[21,22].

Câteva consideratii generale

I. Pentru o teorie a proceselor mentale este evident faptul cã un model al mintii nu este posibil fãrã elaborarea simultanã a unui model al existentei în totalitatea ei. Nu se poate examina cu un ochi nou, filosofic si stiintific, mentalul, fãrã o simultanã reexaminare a întregii realitãti. Modelele mintii merg mânã în mânã cu modelele existentei[23].

II. Procesele mentale sunt procese vii. O teorie, filosoficã sau „partial stiintificã, partial filosoficã”, a mentalului nu este posibilã fãrã o teorie a naturii viului.

Adesea se considerã cã si inteligenta artificialã ar fi un proces mental. Acest punct de vedere, tot mai abandonat, nu poate fi sustinut. Dacã ar fi adevãrat, atunci, la limitã, orice automat ar avea si un proces mental.

Din contrã, pentru inteligenta artificialã si robotii cu inteli gentã artificialã se poate susþine existenta unei forme de psihic, nu un psihic mental, ci un psihic informatic[24].

Revenind la legãtura dintre viu si mental, dacã existã o asemenea legãturã, atunci unde începe sã se manifeste procesul mental? De la ce grad de complexitate al organismelor? De altfel, se pune si întrebarea când anume o structurã devine vie[25]? Adesea se afirmã cã organismele inferioare nu au procese mentale, iar acestea ar apãrea numai la vertebrate, culminând cu mintea omului. Este adevãrat, cum spune Harold Morowitz[26], mintea este o complexitate de procese mentale cu proprietatea gândirii reflexive , dar procesul mental elementar ar putea fi prezent de la cea mai simplã entitate vie. Dacã structuralul va trebui depãsit pentru a întelege viata si mintea, atunci economia gândirii ne obligã sã bãnuim cã aceastã depãsire se face o singurã datã, pentru ambele fenomene.

III. Pentru elucidarea naturii mentalului este nevoie de o fizicã nouã. Acest lucru este demonstrat si sustinut în filosofia ortofizicã, de asemenea de cãtre Roger Penrose, desi acesta propune o nouã fizicã structuralã, precum si de David Chalmers. Si alti autori se gândesc la o fizicã nouã, dar fãrã a aduce argu- mentele autorilor amintiti mai înainte. Pentru a înainta spre o fizicã nouã nu este însã suficientã numai filosofia stiintei. Este necesar sã se gãseascã unul sau câteva puncte de reper de ordin stiintific pe un asemenea drum nou, chiar dacã restul va fi completat cu o plauzibilã speculatie filosoficã, construindu-se astfel teorii stiinþifico-filosofice.

IV. Din momentul în care se vor gãsi puncte de reper stiintifice, în afarã de cele pe care le aduce stiinta neo structuralã[16] contemporanã, dar care sunt insuficiente, atunci se va trece de la etapa filosofiei mentalului, la aceea a teoriilor stiintifico-filosofice ale mentalului.

Cred cã asemenea puncte de reper au si apãrut.

Primul dintre ele este acela al constatãrii existentei unui fenomen „nou” în naturã, nou pentru cã a fost neglijat, si anume „sensul fenomenologic”[20,27] pus în evidentã de autorul filosofiei ortofizice sau „fenomenul experential” constatat, în mod inde pendent, de David Chalmers, acestea fiind identice ( ca feno mene la nivelul mintii umane). Important este faptul cã acest fenomen nu este structural, având o naturã aparte. Numai el poate explica specificitatea mentalului, care are o naturã struc tural-fenomenologicã. De altfel Chalmers aratã în lucrarea sa cã termenul experential este echivalent cu cel de fenomenologic[28].

Dacã sensul fenomenologic este o realitate , si este, si nu este structural, totusi el trebuie sã aibã un suport fizic . Recunoasterea sensului fenomenologic implicã recunoasterea unui asemenea suport. In acest mod am introdus denumirea de informaterie pentru acest suport. Inevitabil, ea trebuie sã fie o realitate.

Dacã procesele mentale au la bazã structuri, si aici in tervine marele merit al neurobiologiei structurale, dar si sensuri fenomenologice, atunci trebuie recunoscutã si exis tenta unui mod de cuplaj între structuri si informaterie, respectiv între procesele structurale si cele fenomenologice . La fel de inevitabil, cuplajul structural-fenomenologic trebuie sã fie o realitate.

Mai mult nu se poate spune cu o anumitã certitudine stiintificã. Spre exemplu, privind natura acestui cuplaj nu se pot face decât speculatii, dar care pot oferi modele pentru viitoare abordãri teoretice si, de ce nu, experimentale.

Pe lângã cele trei puncte stiinþifice de reper de mai înainte, mai intervine încã unul, si anume inferarea justifi catã a existenþei unui substrat profund al întregii realitãti [20,29,30].

Cu aceste patru puncte de sprijin se pot imagina modele re zonabile ale existenþei si, corelat cu acestea, modele ale mentalu lui. Filosofia ortofizicã a stiinþei reprezintã o asemenea încercare.

V. Trecerea de la o stiinþã strict structuralã, ca aceea de astãzi, la una structural-fenomenologicã apare ca foarte plauzibilã. Aceastã trecere va depinde în mare mãsurã de posi bilitatea unei schimbãri corespunzãtoare în metodolo gia stiintei pentru a face fatã proceselor fenome nologice.

Spre o teorie structural-fenomenologicã ortofizicã a mentalului.

O comparatie între cele douã teorii structural-fenomenolo gice a fost prezentatã în altã parte[5].

Principalele elemente privind teoria mentalului, rezultate din filosofia ortofizicã a stiintei, sunt urmãtoarele:

·         Orice interactiune structural-fenomenologicã este un proces mental . Orice proces mental are o parte structuralã si o parte fenomenologicã, dar numai îmbi narea acestora constituie un fenomen mental.

·         Procesul mental este o caracteristicã a viului, probabil caracteristica lui esentialã.

·         Procesul mental nu este posibil fãrã fenomenologic. Natura fenomenologicului este fizicã si informationalã în acelasi timp, si se manifestã prin sensuri fenomenologice.

·         Procesul mental este informaþional în esenta lui.

·         Cuplajul structural-fenomenologic nu se face prin fortele fizice structurale, ci într-un alt mod pe care stiinta urmeazã sã-l elucideze. De aceea el nici nu a putut fi pus în evidentã de fizica structuralã.

·         Cuplajul structural-fenomenologic ar putea implica si nivelul cuantic al realitãtþii , acest lucru apãrând ca necesar în modelul ontologic ortofizic[31]. Aceastã ultimã resursã pentru explicarea mentalului, nivelul cuantic al realitãtii, spre care se îndreaptã mulþi cercetãtori ai mintii si constiintei, mai înainte fiind amintit cel mai important dintre acestia, Roger Penrose, nu va putea rãmâne în domeniul structuralului. Va fi necesarã o nouã fizicã cuanticã, struc tural-fenomenologicã, ca o extindere a fizicii cuantice struc turale de astãzi.

·         In acelasi timp, mintea omului, are un caracter macro scopic. Ea vine în contact, în primul rând cu realitatea macro scopicã, o si construieste, deoarece ansamblurile de particule elementare sau de atomi devin corpuri macroscopice evidente, declarate, numai în prezenta corpului omului care le reflectã prin mintea sa.

·         In minte se poate petrece o îmbinare între macroscopic si microscopic cuantic, ca un proces fizic si informational, structural-fenomenologic, foarte specific, care sã asigure ac tivitatea integratoare a mintii, continuificarea realitãtii externe si interne, fenomenele de intuitie si creativitate s.a.

·         Mintea este un complex de procese mentale , dar acestea se grupeazã în procesoare mentale precum procesorul mental al limbajului natural, procesoarele mentale ale senzatiilor, ale intelectului, ale sentimentelor, ale voinþei, ale memoriei etc. Fiecare asemenea procesor mental este un procesor infor mational structural-fenomenologic. Mintea este un complex de procesoare mentale si procese mentale[32].

·         Fiecare celulã biologicã, fie izolatã, fie parte a unui organism multicelular, are o activitate de ordin mental, fãrã a avea o minte deplinã care sã îmbine toate procesoarele si procesele mentale necesare. In altã parte[33] am prezentat o teorie abstractã structural-fenomenologicã a unei celule bi ologice care pune în evidentã posibilitatea unor procese men tale de tip subconstient.

·         Dacã fiecare celulã a corpului uman are procese mentale, atunci mintea totalã a omului este constituitã din mintea creierului (a sistemului nervos central) plus procesele mentale ale corpului sãu[34].

·         Creierul contine mintea, iar corpul contine mintea totalã . Nu se poate vorbi atunci de corp si minte, sau creier si minte, ca douã entitãti separate, dar nici identic egale.

Deoarece analiza profundã a mentalului începe cu procesele mentale structurale obiective, dar nu se poate împlini fãrã analiza proceselor subiective , trebuie remarcat cum, în lumina oricãrei teorii structural- fenomenologice, ultimele nu sunt subiective în mod absolut . Ele conþin o obiectivitate fizicã si infor mationalã, fiind procese reale, chiar dacã nu pot fi observate di rect din exteriorul organismului.

Un alt aspect la care se referã filosofia clasicã a mentalului este acela al spatialitãtii sau nespatialitãtii fenomenului mental . Unii filosofi ai mintii constatã caracterul nespatial, nelocalizat al mentalului, ceea ce nu este chiar neîndreptãtit. Dar acest fapt poate fi valabil numai pentru expresia fenomenologicã a mentalului, nu însã si pentru partea lui structuralã. O parte din mental se gãseste în structurile creierului, ceea ce S-neurobiologia (neurobiologia structuralã) demonstreazã cu succes. Partea fenomenologicã, în varianta ortofizicã a teoriei structural-fenomenologice a mentalului, se gãseste în informaterie, care în interiorul ei este non-spatialã, ca si întreaga realitate profundã. O teorie SP-neurobiologicã va constata, probabil, dublul caracter, spatial si aspaþial al mintii, dar va remarca dependenþa primordialã a mintii de creier si va afirma cã mintea se gãseste în spaþiul universului acolo unde se gãseste si creierul. Accesul ei într-o zonã non-spaþialã a realitãtii profunde poate constitui o temã de studiu nu lipsitã de impor tantã.

Încheiere

În studiul de fatã s-au prezentat câteva elemente si conside ratii necesare desfãsurãrii unui program de cercetare intitulat „Modelarea structural-fenomenologicã, conceptualã si simbolicã” la Centrul pentru Cercetãri Avansate în Învãtarea Automatã, Prelucrarea Limbajului si Modelare Conceptualã al Academiei Române. Scopul programului este mai larg decât modelarea proceselor mentale, dar unul din obiectivele lui este si acela al realizãrii unei teorii structural-fenomenologice ortofizice a proce selor mentale si a constiintei.

Un program s mai larg (denumit KATEDRAST, dupã numele initiatorilor), dar care se intersecteazã cu cel enuntat mai înainte, cu intentia de a reexamina fundamentele stiintei, în general, a fost formulat recent de prof. Menas Kafatos, prof. Daniele Struppa, ambii de la George Mason University-SUA, prof. Gheorghe Tecuci, de la aceiasi universitate si directorul Centrului Academiei Române menþionat mai înainte, precum si de autorul acestui studiu.